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Sažetak
U radu se istražuje uzročna veza između kvaliteta institucionalnih mera 
i realnog rasta bruto domaćeg proizvoda (BDP) u zemljama Jugoistočne 
Evrope u periodu 1996-2016. godina. Radi dostizanja postavljenog 
cilja istraživanja, korišćena je panel tehnika (Dumitrescu-Hurlin test). 
Teritorija Jugoistočne Evrope ima veoma lošu kontolu korupcije, zatim 
značajnu političku nestabilnost, slabu vladavinu prava i slabu efikasnost 
vlade. Rezultati pokazuju da politička stabilnost homogeno uzrokuje rast 
realnog BDP, a da kontrola korupcije uzrokuje efikasnost vlade. Vladavina 
prava uzrukuje kontrolu korupcije, a efikasnost vlade utiče na političku 
stabilnost. Dodatno, postoji dvosmerna homogena uzročnost između 
vladavine prava i političke stabilnosti. Stoga, istraživanjem se dolazi do 
određenih empirijskih dokaza koji pokazuju da jače institucionalne mere 
dovode do višeg ekonomskog rasta.
Ključne reči: uzročnost, ekonomski rast, efikasnost vlade, korupcija, 
politička stabilnost, vladavina prava
Abstract
The paper researched the causal relationship between institutional quality 
measures and real gross domestic product growth (GDP) on the South 
East European (SEE) countries in the period 1996-2016. To achieve the 
aim of this research the panel techniques (the Dumitrescu-Hurlin non-
causality approach) were used. The SEE suffers from very poor control 
of corruption, as well as significant political instability, the weak rule of 
law and poor government effectiveness. Our results indicate that there is 
unidirectional homogeneous causality between political stability and real 
GDP growth. Control of corruption leads to government effectiveness. The 
rule of law leads to control of corruption, and government effectiveness 
to political stability. Additionally, there is a bidirectional homogeneous 
causality between the rule of law and political stability. Thus, the research 
found some empirical evidence that stronger institutional measures cause 
higher economic growth.
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In the second half of the twentieth century, the economies 
of the South East European countries had different 
historical experiences regarding global economy. While 
countries such as Greece and the former Yugoslavia were 
relatively open and internationally integrated, Albania 
was almost completely isolated, which would further slow 
down its integration into international markets. With the 
end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
state economy of most South East European countries 
collapsed rapidly [55, p. 645]. Industrial production and 
living standards have fallen, while unemployment and 
prices have risen. Thus, for example, many economies of 
the region recorded a decline in the gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the period 1990-91 in some cases by over 20 or 
even 30 percent. Unemployment rose from zero at the 
same time to over 10 percent, while inflation hit double or 
triple digits [43, p. 17]. Consequences of political upheaval 
and war conflict strongly influenced local economies 
at that time completely separated from world markets. 
International sanctions imposed deliberate isolation of 
Serbia and Montenegro. The Greek trade embargo against 
Macedonia in the dispute over the name of the country 
has effectively isolated this country for many years. 
Most of them found themselves on the European “super 
outskirts”, characterized by de-industrialization and 
high unemployment, ethnic and regional fragmentation, 
political turmoil and general instability [55, p. 651]. At the 
same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union hit Romania 
and Bulgaria. Almost overnight, a guaranteed trade 
partnership disappeared and it was replaced by fifteen 
young and economically weak states. In addition, most 
South East European countries were heavily indebted to 
Western banks and governments. Hungary had the largest 
debt per capita (over $ 2,500) and over $ 20 billion, while 
Bulgaria owed nearly $ 10 billion. Unlike them, Romania 
paid off its external debt during the Ceausescu regime, but 
at the cost of total impoverishment of the population [43, 
p. 19]. Integration into international trade was interrupted, 
which led to a chronic balance of payment deficit. Low 
inflows of international capital as a consequence of the 
high risk of many countries dramatically slowed down 
technological development and weakened international 
competitiveness. However, the socialist elite remained a 
powerful political group in the initial phase of the transition 
process in most transition countries, but its power was 
different in different countries, depending on whether they 
were in power alone or in coalitions with new democratic 
movements. The socialist elite or nomenclature which was 
in power, did not have the incentive to create institutions 
that would encourage competition, as this would reduce 
their economic power, which also slowed the economic 
development of many countries in the region [32], [15].
After the year 2000 and democratic changes in Croatia 
and Serbia, the EU has become much more engaged in the 
whole region, so the Europeanization of both political and 
economic strategies has replaced the former independent 
national economic development programs. The huge influx 
of international assistance was followed by consultants in the 
field of international politics who dramatically influenced 
national and local policies. However, according to Bartlett 
[6], this process of policy transfer was not consistent 
because it reflected the various non-compliant views of 
European representatives on the ground. Since the year 
2000, economies, especially those of the Western Balkans, 
have experienced a period of slight recovery except for 
Slovenia [30]. Economic growth was relatively significant 
in comparison with the previous decade, with an average 
of about 4 percent per year from 2000 to 2006. The average 
real GDP growth rose to 6 percent in 2007, before returning 
to about 4.5 percent in 2008. Nevertheless, despite this 
temporary economic growth, the region of Southeast Europe 
still includes some of the poorest countries in Europe. In 
2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina had the lowest income per 
capita, while in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia it was slightly better. Croatia was better positioned, 
with more than three times higher income per capita 
in comparison with Bosnia and Herzegovina [6, p. 23]. 
Although there are also new EU member states among 
them, along with formerly associated Greece, due to great 
difficulties in linking with the global economy, they are 
still considered to be the outskirts of Europe in relation 
to the countries of Western Europe.
This paper aims to examine the causal relationship 
between institutional quality measures and GDP growth 
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in the SEE countries. The research was conducted using 
the real gross domestic product as the dependent variable, 
and government effectiveness, control of corruption, 
political stability, and the rule of law as independent 
variables. This paper lies in the hypothesis that there is a 
causal relationship between institutional quality and gross 
domestic product growth in SEE countries. The causal 
relationship between selected variables is investigated 
using the Dumitrescu-Hurlin non-causality approach for 
the period from 1996 to 2016. Although there are economic 
studies that explore the causal link between institutional 
variables and economic growth for different countries of 
the world, studies of this type of causality for the countries 
of South-Eastern Europe are very rare and are reduced to 
examining a smaller number of institutional variables. 
The contribution of this paper is the research of causality 
between examined variables (four institutional variables 
and GDP) in SEE countries. In general, our research 
shows some empirical evidence that stronger institutional 
measures cause higher economic growth. 
Apart from the introductory (first) section, the paper 
consists of four parts. A literature overview is presented in 
the second section. The third section explains our research 
methodology. The fourth section contains results and 
discussions. The conclusion is presented in the fifth section.
Literature Review
Many previous economic studies have examined the 
relationship between political stability, corruption, 
government effectiveness, and other institutional variables 
and economic growth. Relying on this kind of general 
research, we decided to present some empirical evidence 
on the factors that influence the economic growth of the 
countries of South East Europe in the given period.
Aixalá and Fabro [2] tested institutional variables 
looking to find out which one is the most appropriate in 
the growth model, depending on the income levels of 
countries. Their results show that for the rich countries, 
the rule of law is fundamental, while for the poor, it 
is the control of corruption. Chong and Calderon [11] 
examined the causal link between institutional measures 
and economic growth. It turned out that the poorer the 
country the longer it awaits the improvement of institutional 
measures, thus strengthening the impact of these measures 
on economic growth. However, they also point to the 
existence of reverse causality, or to the fact that economic 
growth affects the increase in the quality of institutional 
measures. Similarly, Glaeser et al. [33] empirically test 
the causal link between the quality of institutions and 
economic growth. They find that human capital is a more 
fundamental source of growth than institutions. They 
also claim that poorer countries get out of poverty due to 
good policies, which subsequently increases the quality 
of their political institutions. In their empirical analysis 
Knack and Keefer [44] conclude that different institutional 
measures, such as increasing the efficiency of bureaucracy, 
property rights and political stability of the country, have 
a positive statistically significant relation to the economic 
performance of the country. The authors who investigated 
the relationship between institutional factors and economic 
growth are Aparicio et al. [4], Young and Sheehan [58], Lee 
et al. [45]. Esfahani and Ramıŕez [28] develop a structural 
model that includes institutional and economic factors 
that mediate in the infrastructure-GDP interactions. The 
results show that institutional measures that give credibility 
and effectiveness to government policy play a particularly 
important role in the process of economic growth through 
investment in infrastructure. The effects of this model 
indicate that countries can achieve much in improving 
investment and performance in infrastructure, but that 
requires institutional and organizational reforms that are 
more important than the simple design of infrastructure 
projects. Evans and Rauch [29] emphasize the importance 
of a good bureaucracy for the country’s economic growth 
and suggest that policymakers should pay great attention 
to building better bureaucracies. They claim that further 
research in social sciences is needed on variations in how 
to organize state bureaucracy. Yanovskiy and Shulgin [57] 
found significant positive interdependencies between 
democracy indicators and economic growth. Efendic and 
Pugh [26] utilized dynamic panel analysis to investigate 
the relationship between institutional improvement and 
economic performance in 29 transition countries in the 
period 1992–2007. They found that per capita GDP is 
determined by the entire history of institutional reform 
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under transition. Thus, there exist institutional effects on 
economic performance in transition countries. 
Political corruption in transition countries was 
examined by Goel and Budak [34]. Their results indicate 
that greater economic prosperity of the country certainly 
reduces corruption. These authors suggest that transitional 
countries need to undertake comprehensive reforms to 
reduce corruption. Budak and Rajh [9] find that high levels 
of corruption in the Western Balkan represent a serious 
obstacle to a successful business and conclude that the 
more visible corruption it is more connected with the 
state institutions and the government by the business 
community. For Mauro [48; 49], corruption has significant, 
detrimental effects on economic growth, which opens the 
issue of individual countries that, despite this, do not work 
to eradicate corruption and improve the performance of 
their institutions. As one of the possible reasons, Mauro [49] 
suggests the fact that individuals in cases where corruption 
is widespread do not have incentives, or institutional 
support to fight against it. In support of his claims, he 
gives the example of two illustrative models. Podobnik 
et al. [53] analyse the dependence of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita growth rates on the changes 
in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in the period 
1999-2004 for all countries in the world. These authors 
find that, on average, the increase in CPI for those units 
leads to an increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita of 1.7%. However, once the transition countries in 
Europe have set aside, the authors have concluded that an 
increase in the CPI for those units generates an increase in 
the annual GDP growth rate per capita by as much as 2.4%. 
At the same time, they analysed the relationship between 
foreign direct investment and CPI and concluded that the 
decrease in corruption leads to a significant increase in 
the country’s wealth.
The authors who examined the link between 
corruption and economic growth are Cieślik and Goczek 
[12], d’Agostino et al. [14], Huang [37], Dzhumashev [21]. 
Ehrlich and Lui [27] analysed the impact of bureaucratic 
corruption on economic growth at various stages of 
economic development and under various political and 
economic regimes. Mo [50] calculates quantitatively the 
impact of corruption on economic growth and finds that 
increasing corruption by 1% reduces the rate of growth by 
0.72%. This author particularly points out that political 
instability is an important channel through which 
corruption affects economic growth. Drury et al. [19] also 
empirically test the impact of corruption on economic 
growth. These authors use time series for more than 
100 countries between 1982 and 1997 and show that in 
democratic countries, corruption does not have a significant 
effect on economic growth, which is not the case with 
non-democratic countries. In contrast, corruption has 
a significant impact on economic growth. Svensson [56] 
reveals a negative relation between the level of corruption 
and country wealth factors, such as GDP, leading to a 
conclusion that the higher level of corruption causes a 
higher level of poverty. Dridi [18] examines the impact 
of corruption on various economic growth variables such 
as GDP per capita, political instability and some dummy 
variables. This author finds that there is a negative effect of 
corruption on economic growth and that it comes from the 
impact of human capital and political instability. Gyimah-
Brempong [36] uses panel data for African countries to 
explore the impact of corruption on economic growth 
and distribution of income. The author uses a dynamic 
panel estimator and finds that corruption reduces the rate 
of economic growth and income per capita. His results 
show that increased corruption is positively correlated 
with inequality of income, which means that corruption 
more affects poorer African countries than the rich ones. 
De Vaal and Ebben [17] emphasize the overall effect of 
corruption on economic growth is highly dependent on the 
institutional setting of a country. Especially in situations 
where institutions are not well-developed corruption 
can be conducive to economic growth. Therefore, they 
emphasize the importance of taking into account the 
complete institutional setting in the study of corruption, 
both theoretical and empirical. Lučić et al. [47] analyse the 
impact of corruption (measured by Corruption Perceptions 
Index) on economic development (measured by GDP per 
year) of each country. These authors have shown that the 
change in GDP has been postponed for 6 to 10 years after 
the change in the level of corruption, and vice versa, i.e. the 
strongest causality between these two variables is noticed 
in the so-called medium-term framework. 
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Concerning political freedoms and economic growth, 
Przeworski and Limongi [54] conclude that political 
institutions are important for economic growth. Barro 
[5], using data for 100 countries between 1960 and 1990, 
conducted a panel analysis that led to the conclusion that 
political freedoms have a weak effect on economic growth, 
but that there are some indications for the non-linear 
relationship between these variables. He believes that 
when political rights are low, their expansion stimulates 
economic growth, but where there is already a moderate 
level of democracy, further expansion of these rights reduces 
economic growth. Begović et al. [7] showed that there is 
some empirical evidence that an increase in democracy 
boosts the development of financial intermediation and 
then such improved financial intermediation supports 
economic growth. Huang [38] shows that improved 
institutional quality is associated with increases in financial 
development at least in the short run. For the lower-
income countries, this effect is expected to persist over 
longer horizons. Alesina et al. [3] studied the relationship 
between political instability and economic growth, that 
is, GDP growth per capita for 113 countries in the period 
1950-1982. Their main finding is that in countries and 
periods with a high incidence of government collapse, 
growth is significantly lower than otherwise.
Research Methodology
Data Analysis
This study aims to examine the relationship between the 
growth of the real gross domestic product, government 
effectiveness, control of corruption, political stability and 
the rule of law in the South East European countries. Data 
for growth of GDP are collected from World Development 
Indicators (WDI), while data for government effectiveness, 
control of corruption, political stability, and the rule of 
law are collected from World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) of the World Bank database. Kaufmann et al. [41, 
42] explain these institutional quality measures in detail. 
These indicators are measured in units that range from -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong), and they describe the following [2]:
• Government Effectiveness (GE) combines perceptions 
of the quality of public service provision and 
administration, the independence of the civil service 
from political pressure, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitments.
• Control of Corruption (CC) measures perceptions of 
the exercise of public power for private gain.
• Political Stability (PS) measures perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilised 
by unconstitutional means.
• Rule of Law (RL) measures the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. 
These include perceptions of the incidence of both 
violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability 
of contracts [2].
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of selected 
independent variables in the model for each country, 
respectively. From the data presented in Table 1, it can 
be seen that Slovenia, according to all parameters, is 
superior to other SEE countries. Namely, Slovenia has the 
best government effectiveness, control of corruption, the 
highest political stability and the best rule of law. Also, 
the standard deviation of these variables is quite low for 
Slovenia.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has the worst government 
effectiveness, while Albania has the worst control of 
corruption. Report of European Commission [23] notices 
that “Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage in the area 
of the judiciary. The constitutional and legal framework 
governing the judiciary is incomplete and does not provide 
sufficient guarantees of independence, accountability, and 
efficiency.“ Report of European Commission for Albania 
states that corruption prevails in many areas of Albania 
and remains an issue of importance [22]. Turkey has the 
weakest political stability (this is in line with [24]), while 
Serbia and Albania have the worst rule of law compared 
to all SEE countries. Standard deviations for all variables 
for Serbia are quite high compared to standard deviations 
for other countries, especially for Slovenia. Petrović et al. 
[52] empirically showed that Serbia’s economic growth 
laggard due to deficient institutions, specifically lacking 
the rule of law and control of corruption. However, looking 
at the summary for all SEE countries, it can be said that 




corruption, significant political instability, the weak rule 
of law and poor government effectiveness. 
The Model
An unbalanced panel data from 1996 to 2016 is used in 
this study. The model is specified as follows:
GDPit = α + β1GEit + β2CCit + β3PSit + β4RLit + εit (1)
The dependent variable is the growth of real GDPi,t, 
and regressors are GEi,t, CCi,t, PSi,t, and RLi,t. α is the 
intercept, and β1, β2, β3, β4 are the slope coefficients of the 
models, i represents the country, t is the time, and εi,t is 
the error term, independently and identically normally 
distributed with zero mean, i.e. εi,t ~N(0,σ
2). 
The test of cross-sectional dependence
De Hoyos and Sarafidis [16] consider “the standard 
panel-data model as:
yi,t = αi + β'xi,t + ui,t, i=1,…,N and t=1,…,T (2)
where xi,t is a K×1 vector of regressors, β is a K×1 vector of 
parameters to be estimated, and αi represents time-invariant 
individual nuisance parameters”. The null hypothesis 
assumed that ui,t is independent and identically distributed 
over periods and across cross-sectional units. The alternative 
hypothesis supposed that ui,t could be correlated across 
cross-sections, while there is the assumption of no serial 
correlation [16]. De Hoyos and Sarafidis [16] explain that 
Breusch and Pagan [8] proposed an LM statistic: 
  LM = T ∑i=1
N-1 ∑Nj=i+1ρ ̂ 
2
ij (3) 
which is valid for fixed N as T→∞. In equation (3) ρ ̂ 2ij is 
the sample estimate of the pairwise correlation of the 
residuals and ûi,t is the estimate of  ui,t in equation (2).














Under the null hypothesis, LM statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 with N(N-1)/2 degrees of freedom [16].
The second generation panel unit root test
Breusch-Pagan LM test shows cross-section dependence 
in our panel data model, and then we applied second 
generation unit root test to examine stationarity of the 
used data. Hurlin and Mignon [39] notice that the second 
generation unit root tests are robust to the cross-sectional 
dependence. We used Pesaran [51] test that is explained 
by Hurlin and Mignon [39]. They highlight that Pesaran 
suggests various models to explain the cross-sectional 
dependencies problem, and a one-factor model with 
heterogeneous loading factors for residuals is one of them. 
Hurlin and Mignon [39] describe that Pesaran augments 
the standard Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions with the 
cross-section average of lagged levels and first-differences 
of the individual series.
Pesaran’s cross-sectional augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) regression (CADF) is specified as follows:
Δyi,t = ai + bi yi,t-1 + ci ȳt-1 + di Δ ȳt + ei,t.  (5)
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of selected independent variables
  Government Effectiveness Control of Corruption Political Stability Rule of Law
1996-2016 mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
Albania -0.38 0.22 -0.70 0.17 -0.18 0.30 -0.60 0.19
B&H -0.71 0.21 -0.35 0.08 -0.46 0.22 -0.41 0.17
Bulgaria 0.09 0.12 -0.17 0.12 0.25 0.18 -0.11 0.07
Croatia 0.48 0.18 0.04 0.25 0.52 0.20 0.07 0.25
Greece 0.58 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.25 0.40 0.68 0.25
North Macedonia -0.21 0.26 -0.33 0.24 -0.56 0.32 -0.33 0.14
Montenegro 0.08 0.15 -0.19 0.22 0.41 0.27 -0.05 0.25
Romania -0.26 0.13 -0.26 0.16 0.21 0.21 -0.02 0.15
Serbia -0.29 0.34 -0.50 0.34 -0.55 0.58 -0.60 0.39
Slovenia 0.98 0.11 0.93 0.14 1.05 0.14 1.01 0.08
Turkey 0.17 0.18 -0.08 0.18 -1.03 0.34 0.03 0.10
SEE countries 0.04 0.14 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.10
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WGI data. 
Notes: B&H – Bosnia and Herzegovina.











i=1  ; ti(N,T) is 
the t-statistic of the OLS estimate of bi [39]. The null 
hypothesis of panel unit root tests is that variables contain 
panel unit root, while the alternative hypothesis is that 
the individual panel series is stationary. 
The Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel Granger non-causality test
The Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel Granger non-causality 
test is used to examine the causal relationships among 
the growth of GDP, government effectiveness, control of 
corruption, political stability, and the rule of law.
Dumitrescu and Hurlin [20] provide a simple Granger1 
[35] non-causality test for heterogenous panel data models. 
The two stationary variables observations for individual 
i in period t are presented by xit and yit [46]. Dumitrescu 
and Hurlin [20] defined the linear model:
yi,t = αi + ∑
K
k=1γi,k yi,t-k + ∑
K
k=1βi,k xi,t-k + εi,t (6)
where i=1,…, N, at time t=1,…, T, with K ∊ N*. The model 
in equation (6) allows investigating Granger causality in 
a panel data context [20]. It is assumed that coefficients 
are time-invariant and differ across individuals. The null 
hypothesis is:
H0 : βi1 = ... = βiK = 0       ∀i = 1,…,N (7)
that means there is no causality for all individuals in the 
panel [46].
Dumitrescu and Hurlin [20] define the alternative 
hypothesis as:
H1 : βi = 0       ∀i = 1,…,N1
 βi ≠ 0       ∀i = N1 + 1, N1 + 2…,N  (8)
Where N1 is unknown and the condition 0 ≤ N1/N < 1 is 
fulfilled. It is necessary that the ratio  is less than one. 
There is no causality for any of the individuals in the 
panel if N1 = N which is according to the homogenous 
non causality null hypothesis. In case N1 = 0, causality 
for all the individuals in the panel exists [20].
1 Granger [35] test developed a methodology for analysing the causal re-
lationships between time series [46].
Results and Discussion
Before testing of stationarity of variables, Breusch-Pagan 
LM test of independence is applied. We used Breusch-
Pagan LM test because the time dimension is longer 
than the number of countries in our sample (T>N). 
Result of this test is: χ2 = 256.547 with p = 0.000. So, we 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional 
dependence, and the analyzed variables are crosssectionally 
dependent. Thus, we have used second generation unit 
root test for lag=0, according to different criteria (the 
Akaike, the Schwarz, the Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion, etc.). The criteria for lag selection are presented 
in appendix A in Table A1.
The order of integration for each series (i.e. variable 
in the model) is determined. Namely, Pesaran’s CADF 
panel unit root test was used, and the results are presented 
in Table 2. The results of this test showed that variables 
growth of real GDP and the rule of law are stationary at 
level, otherwise control of corruption and political stability 
are nonstationary at level. Government effectiveness 
variable is stationary at level only using Pesaran’s CADF 
test with constant. All five variables are stationary at the 
first differences. 
Table 2. The second generation unit root test results
Variables
Level First Difference
Constant Constant  & Trend Constant
Constant  
& Trend





































Note: gGDP is real GDP growth, GE is government effectiveness, CC is control of 
corruption, PS is political stability, and RL is rule of law; p-values are presented in the 
parentheses; Pesaran’s CADF test is calculated for lag=0 based on different criterion.
The results of the first generation unit root test (the 
Levin, Lin and Chu, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS), ADF-
Fisher, and PP-Fisher panel unit root tests) are presented 
in the appendix A in Table A2. According to the first 
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generation unit root tests, we can conclude that variable 
control of corruption is stationary at level, while real GDP 
growth is stationary at level, except when the Levin, Lin 
and Chu test with intercept and trend is used. Political 
stability variable is stationary at level, observing four unit 
root tests first generation with intercept. This variable is 
stationary using the Levin, Lin and Chu and PP-Fisher 
tests with intercept and trend, but it is nonstationary 
applying the Im-Pesaran-Shin and ADF-Fisher tests with 
intercept and trend. Government effectiveness and rule of 
law variables are stationary using all tests with intercept 
and trend. These variables are nonstationary in applied 
tests with intercept, except government effectiveness that 
is stationary according to the Levin, Lin and Chu test. All 
analysed variables are stationary at the first differences 
applying the first generation unit root tests.
Comparing the results of the first and second generation 
unit root tests, we can observe that the variable growth 
of real GDP is stationary i.e. I(0). The variable rule of law 
is stationary, applying the second generation unit root 
test and the first generation unit root tests with intercept 
and trend. Conclusions about the stationarity of control 
of corruption, government effectiveness, and political 
stability vary depending on the generation of the test. 
When we use the second generation unit root test, control 
of corruption and political stability are integrated of order 
one i.e. I(1), while these variables are stationary at level i.e. 
I(0) according to the first generation unit root tests. The 
government effectiveness variable is stationary at level, 
applying the second generation unit root test with constant. 
Opposite, this variable is stationary at level according to 
the first generation unit root tests with intercept and trend. 
After obtaining stationary variables, testing for 
Granger non-causality in heterogeneous panels was applied 
i.e. the Dumitrescu Hurlin test, also taking into account 
cross-section dependence by bootstrapping procedure. 
The Dumitrescu Hurlin test was estimated to examine the 
causal relationship among the first differences of selected 
variables (real GDP growth, government effectiveness, control 
of corruption, political stability, and rule of law). Results 
of the Dumitrescu Hurlin test are presented in Table 3.
Results from Table 3 show that in six cases, the 
null hypothesis about homogeneous non-causality can 
be rejected. There is Granger unidirectional causality 
between the first differences of political stability and real 
GDP growth at the 5 percent level in the SEE countries, 
namely political stability homogeneously causes real GDP 
growth. The control of corruption homogeneously causes 
Table 3. Pairwise Dumitrescu Hurlin Panel Causality Tests
 Null Hypothesis: W-Stat. Zbar-Stat. Prob.  Direction
 ΔCC does not homogeneously cause ΔgGDP  0.625 -0.957 0.339 No causality between ΔCC and ΔgGDP
 ΔgGDP does not homogeneously cause ΔCC  0.871 -0.581 0.561
 ΔGE does not homogeneously cause ΔgGDP  0.651 -0.910 0.363 No causality between ΔGE and ΔgGDP
 ΔgGDP does not homogeneously cause ΔGE  1.353  0.132 0.895
 ΔPS does not homogeneously cause ΔgGDP  2.717  2.084 0.037 Unidirectional causality from ΔPS to ΔgGDP
 ΔgGDP does not homogeneously cause ΔPS  1.318  0.066 0.947
 ΔRL does not homogeneously cause ΔgGDP  1.391  0.216 0.829 No causality between ΔRL and ΔgGDP
 ΔgGDP does not homogeneously cause ΔRL  0.374 -1.342 0.179
 ΔGE does not homogeneously cause ΔCC  1.728  0.691 0.490 Unidirectional causality from ΔCC to ΔGE
 ΔCC does not homogeneously cause ΔGE  2.504  1.844 0.065
 ΔPS does not homogeneously cause ΔCC  2.191  1.325 0.185 No causality between ΔPS and ΔCC
 ΔCC does not homogeneously cause ΔPS  1.261 -0.017 0.987
 ΔRL does not homogeneously cause ΔCC  3.148  2.908 0.004 Unidirectional causality from ΔRL to ΔCC
 ΔCC does not homogeneously cause ΔRL  0.974 -0.422 0.673
 ΔPS does not homogeneously cause ΔGE  1.863  0.851 0.395 Unidirectional causality from ΔGE to ΔPS
 ΔGE does not homogeneously cause ΔPS  2.859  2.289 0.022
 ΔRL does not homogeneously cause ΔGE  1.142 -0.181 0.857 No causality between ΔRL and ΔGE
 ΔGE does not homogeneously cause ΔRL  0.913 -0.521 0.602
 ΔRL does not homogeneously cause ΔPS  2.841  2.263 0.024 Bidirectional causality between ΔRL and ΔPS
 ΔPS does not homogeneously cause ΔRL  2.853  2.280 0.023
Source: Authors’ calculation
Note: gGDP is real GDP growth, GE is government effectiveness, CC is control of corruption, PS is political stability, and RL is rule of law, Δ is the first difference operator.
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government effectiveness at the 10 percent level, which means 
there is Granger causality between the first differences of 
control of corruption and government effectiveness. The 
Granger causality between the first differences of rule of 
law and control of corruption is observed at the 1 percent 
level because rule of law homogeneously causes control 
of corruption. At the 5 percent level, there is Granger 
homogeneous causality between the first differences 
of government effectiveness and political stability. 
Bidirectional homogeneous causality is noticed between 
the first differences of rule of law and political stability 
at the 5 percent level. 
Therefore, the results of this paper showed that 
there is some empirical evidence to support the paper 
hypothesis that there is a causal relationship between 
some institutional quality measures and gross domestic 
product growth in SEE countries. Our results show that 
some institutional quality measures cause economic 
growth, which partially coincides with research by Chong 
and Calderon [11], and Petrović et al. [52].
Acemoglu et al. [1] conclude that the cause of 
slow economic growth in some countries can be found 
in institutions, while macroeconomic policies that do 
not lead to growth are their consequence. The poor 
institutions’ quality, which includes the lack of rule of 
law, the prevalence of corruption and the high degree of 
political instability, causes misguided and inadequate 
macroeconomic policies [10].
Cvetanović et al. [13] pointed out that „institutions 
play an important role in increasing the functionality of 
society, and in particular, in increasing economic efficiency. 
They must provide predictable and coherent rules, but 
in spite of this, institutional changes and adjustments to 
social preferences, technology, political and socioeconomic 
structures and external factors are necessary. The essence 
of the existence of quality institutions is that, by creating 
rules of the game in the economic and political sphere, 
adequate incentives influence the behavior of economic 
entities towards improving the quality of key macroeconomic 
performances“.
Strong institutions influence high levels of income 
per capita, as they shape the conditions for investment, 
technological progress, and growth [10]. A stable and efficient 
legislative and legal system is of primary importance for 
the process of economic growth. In areas where corruption 
and incomplete protection of property rights are evident, 
low investment returns become available or they are not 
present at all, and this logically affects the slowdown in 
economic growth [13].
Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between the 
growth of the real gross domestic product, government 
effectiveness, control of corruption, political stability and 
the rule of law in the South East European countries in 
the period 1996-2016. To achieve the aim of this paper, 
the panel framework is used. The Dumitrescu-Hurlin 
panel Granger non-causality test is also employed to 
examine the causal relationship between the selected 
variables. Analysing descriptive statistics of our data, 
according to all variables Slovenia predominates to other 
SEE countries and the volatility of these variables is fairly 
low compared to other countries in the region. Slovenia is 
the best example of a country where improvement in the 
quality of institutional factors led to economic growth. 
Although it represented the country in transition in 1996, 
Slovenia managed to achieve better results in controlling 
corruption, government effectiveness and the quality of 
the rule of law in comparison with the countries that 
did not go through such economic turbulences, such as 
Greece and Turkey. Croatia is second to Slovenia when 
it comes to political stability. However, the parameter 
shows a great difference in mean value (Slovenia 1.05, 
Croatia 0.52). While Bosnia and Herzegovina has the 
poorest government effectiveness, Albania is the worst 
ranked regarding the control of corruption. According 
to the results obtained, it turned out that Turkey has the 
weakest political stability, while Serbia has the poorest rule 
of law compared to all SEE countries. However, observing 
all SEE countries it can be said that the entire SEE region 
(except for Slovenia) suffers from very poor control of 
corruption, followed by significant political instability, 
the weak rule of law and poor government effectiveness. 
There is a unidirectional homogeneous causality between 
some observed variables. It can be concluded that political 
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stability causes real GDP growth. In addition, it has been 
found that control of corruption causes government 
effectiveness; rule of law causes control of corruption, 
and government effectiveness causes political stability. 
There is only bidirectional homogeneous causality 
between the rule of law and political stability. Thus, some 
institutional quality measures cause economic growth in 
SEE countries that is unequivocally indicated by the latest 
reports of the European Union and the assessment of the 
state of democracy in the region of various monitoring 
organizations such as Freedom House [31], the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [40] and 
the Economist [25]. Political interference and pressure, 
the deterioration of independent institutions and the 
strengthening of the executive power affect the rule of 
law in most South East European countries. This is a 
long-lasting problem, but nowadays it is indicated that 
these trends are on the rise. However, it is notable that 
political elites do not show commitment to changing the 
situation. Being accustomed to solving economic problems 
in the short term through various types of international 
assistance, these elites do not show interest in improving 
institutional measures for the purpose of economic and 
political progress. Therefore, important further research 
can be directed towards exploring the causal relationship 
between institutional measures and the inflow of foreign 
direct investment in the SEE countries.
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Appendix A
Table A1. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0  103.3286 NA*   2.88e-08*  -3.171891*  -3.000348*  -3.104539*
1  119.0629  28.42310  3.90e-08 -2.872995 -1.843737 -2.468882
2  139.2837  33.26659  4.62e-08 -2.718830 -0.831856 -1.977956
3  161.8541  33.49147  5.21e-08 -2.640453  0.104236 -1.562819
4  184.2589  29.63218  6.13e-08 -2.556738  1.045667 -1.142343
5  207.9784  27.54530  7.33e-08 -2.515434  1.944687 -0.764278
6  236.5397  28.56130  8.12e-08 -2.630314  2.687522 -0.542398
7  264.5418  23.48558  1.03e-07 -2.727154  3.448397 -0.302477
8  294.6571  20.40068  1.45e-07 -2.892164  4.141103 -0.130726
Notes: * Indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR – sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE – Final prediction error; AIC – Akaike information 
criterion; SC – Schwarz information criterion; HQ – Hannan-Quinn information criterion.
Table A2. Unit root test results – the first generation
Variables
Level First Difference
Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend
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Note: Schwarz automatic selection of the lag length has been used for the unit root tests; probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality; p-values are presented in the parentheses.
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